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Puerto Rican A Preliminary
Politics in Assessment
the United States
Jose E. Cru:
This article examines the following question: What characterizes Puerto Rican political
development and what promise does electoral politics holdfor Puerto Ricans in the
United States? Its central premise is that an analyticalframework which focuses on eco-
nomic deprivation and racial prejudice is partial and inadequate to an understanding of
the political experience of Puerto Ricans. Throughout the years, mainland Puerto
Ricans have moved in and out of the political stage holding the banners of anticolonial-
ism, separatism, incorporation, and ethnic identity in search of vantage pointsfrom
which they can satisfy their cultural, social, and economic needs. Despite the Airbus and
circular migration, Puerto Ricans are part of established, stable, and integrated commu-
nities; in other words, they are a group that has been consistently interested in improv-
ing its socioeconomic status through electoral politics. There is, however, a negative
corollary to this premise: while strong evidence suggests that electoral politics matters
and does make a difference in the life chances and actual progress ofpreviously exclud-
ed groups, this does not seem to be true for Puerto Ricans. But while this would indicate
that electoral politics offers an empty promise, there are reasons that suggest a different
approach to the question ofpolitical representation, namely, focusing on the leadership
qualities and the demographic and political context necessaryfor success.
The history of Latinos in the United States has been characterized as one of "open
conflict, economic deprivation, and racial prejudice. . . . Mexican-Americans, Puerto
Ricans, and Cubans share this overall framework." ! Within that framework, Mexican-
American history has received special attention and emphasis, partly because Mexican-
American problems allegedly "foreshadow those of all Hispanics." 2
This is surely a partial and inadequate framework for understanding Latino politics in
the United States. It is particularly inadequate for an analysis of Puerto Rican politics
because it neither captures nor does justice to the richness and complexity of the Puerto
Rican experience. That experience includes, without a doubt, the aforementioned ele-
ments, but it also registers instances of intergroup cooperation and solidarity, social
progress, and political incorporation.
Mexican-Americans represent the oldest Latino group in the United States. But their
experience is not that of other Latino subgroups. It is important to emphasize this point
because scholars often give it no more than lip service. For example, no other Latino
subgroup has experienced "expulsions, deportations, lynchings . . . labor wars, orga
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"Early in the 1990s, Puerto Ricans used reapportionment and
redistricting to increase their level ofpolitical represen-
tation. Now they must turn to other strategies. These include
enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, increasing the
number ofPuerto Ricans who run for office, and increasing
the number of those who vote. In light ofmarked demo-
graphic dispersion, Puerto Ricans will have to build more
and better coalitions with African-Americans, whites,
and others, as they have done brilliantly in the past in places
like Massachusetts and Connecticut."
— Jose E. Cruz
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nized banditry, filibustering expeditions, and three formal wars." 3 Also, no other group
has dominated the political life of an American state as Latinos in New Mexico did
for three generations. 4 Only the experience of Puerto Ricans on their island parallels this
one, but the similarities are superficial and the comparison inappropriate. In short, a
historical characterization suggesting that the Mexican-American experience is paradig-
matic stretches the limits of comparative analysis and uses a lens that distorts the image
of Latino political development.
The analysis of Latino politics in the United States requires a new account and a new
synthesis of Latino historical development that builds upon a polythematic interpretive
framework. Such analysis must identify the factors that have contributed to the forma-
tion of a Latino community based on the elaboration of the following themes: the rela-
tionship between separatist and accommodationist tendencies as strategies to promote
policy responsiveness, anticolonialism and anticommunism as political mobilization
strategies, and the politicization of ethnicity as a strategy for socioeconomic progress
and political incorporation. I contend that these broad themes are the fundamental ele-
ments of an integrative dynamic of political development which foreshadows the emer-
gence of a new American identity.
In this context, what characterizes Puerto Rican political development and what
promise does electoral politics hold for Puerto Ricans in the United States? The central
premise of this article is that, with the probable exception of anticommunism, the
themes cited above articulate the political experience of Puerto Ricans in the United
States. Throughout the years, mainland Puerto Ricans have moved in and out of the
political stage holding the banners of anticolonialism, separatism, incorporation, and
ethnic identity in search of a permanent space, a vantage point or points from which
they can satisfy their cultural, social, and economic needs. I have arrayed below the evi-
dence in support of this contention under three categories: incorporation, separatism,
and identity.
I emphasize the notion of permanent space to suggest that, despite the Airbus and cir-
cular migration, we are looking at individuals who are part of established, stable, and
integrated communities; in other words, they are a group that has been consistently
interested in improving its socioeconomic status through electoral politics. But there is a
negative corollary to this premise: while strong evidence suggests that electoral politics
matters and does make a difference in the life chances and actual progress of previously
excluded groups, 5 this does not seem to be true for Puerto Ricans — or Latinos — at
least not yet.
The evidence that buttresses these claims comes from two sources: research on
Puerto Rican political development in the city of Hartford, Connecticut, and two surveys
of Puerto Rican elected officials that I conducted in 1989 and 1992. 6 Because data from
one city cannot be used to generalize about Puerto Ricans in the United States, my
assessment is, as the title indicates, preliminary. Yet the Hartford experience is both use-
ful and refreshing because it provides a counterpoint to the tendency to see the U.S.
Puerto Rican experience as the New York experience writ large. The surveys, on the
other hand, give us an image of Puerto Rican political representation that can be corre-
lated with their socioeconomic status.
Hartford is a medium-size city with a population of 140,000. According to the 1990
census, Puerto Ricans number about 40,000, or 27 percent of the total. Proportionally,
this is the largest Puerto Rican community in the United States. New York City com-
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Table 1
U.S. Cities with Large Puerto Rican Concentrations, 1990
State and City Total Population Puerto Ricans
Percentage
of Total
California
Los Angeles 3,485,398 14,367 0.4
Connecticut
Bridgeport
Hartford
New Haven
New Britain
141,686
139,739
130,474
75,491
30,250
38,176
13,866
10,325
21
27
11
14
New York
New York City
Rochester
Yonkers
7,322,564
231,636
188,082
896,763
16,383
14,420
12
7
8
New Jersey
Camden
Elizabeth
Jersey City
Newark
Paterson
87,492
110,002
228,537
275,221
140,891
22,984
12,062
30,950
41,545
27,580
26
11
14
15
20
Massachusetts
Boston
Lawrence
Springfield
574,283
70,207
156,983
25,767
14,661
23,729
4
21
15
Ohio
Cleveland 505,616 17,829 4
Pennsylvania
Philadelphia
Reading
1,585,577
78,380
67,857
11,612
4
Florida
Miami 358,548 72,827 20
Illinois
Chicago 2,783,726 119,866 4
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1990 Census of Population, unpublished data.
pares with only three of the twenty-one cities with the largest concentrations of Puerto
Ricans — Chicago, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia— while Hartford is comparable to six
—Bridgeport, Connecticut, Elizabeth, New Jersey, New Haven, Connecticut,
Paterson, New Jersey, Springfield, Massachusetts, and Yonkers, New York. In terms of the
proportion of the total Puerto Rican population of a big city, New York has no
parallel, while Hartford compares with Bridgeport, Paterson, and to a lesser extent,
Springfield. Moreover, while New York City is the only large city where Puerto Ricans
make up more than 10 percent of the total population, they comprise more than 10
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percent of the population in eight of the ten medium-size cities — those with between
150,000 and 250,000 inhabitants. Their total number in these ten cities, 218,158, ac-
counts for 8 percent of U.S. Puerto Ricans.
Incorporation
In the political science literature, the analysis of electoral participation is typically ex-
plained in reference to the social and psychological characteristics of voters. 7 An elec-
torate composed of young, uneducated, and alienated people participates less than one
composed of older, better educated, and integrated individuals. 8 In the case of Puerto
Ricans, this approach is offered in tandem with the observation that their interest in
the island politics of Puerto Rico has affected their interest in mainland politics, effec-
tively reducing their level of participation. 9 This dynamic has been synthesized in the
literature on Puerto Rican politics in terms of two distinctions: the first refers to differ-
ences between "migrants" and "citizens" 10 and the second to the dilemma between
island- and mainland-based politics. 11
Concerning these issues, my research of Puerto Rican political development in
Hartford suggests that individual characteristics might be less important as determinants
of political participation than the structure of partisan and electoral options available
to voters. In Hartford, the political incorporation of Puerto Ricans was rapid largely
because the city Democratic Party was interested in mobilizing their support, even when
their numbers within the electorate were small. Ironically, the fact that the Democratic
Party dominated the city also helped, because in this context Puerto Ricans felt closer
to home. Because almost all newcomers were supporters of the Partido Popular
Democratico in Puerto Rico, they readily identified with and sought membership in
Hartford's Democratic Party, assuming that the two organizations were similar in social
composition and goals. Education did have an impact on participation, but not in the
sense that the least educated were apathetic. On the contrary, it was not until the 1970s
that the social composition of the political leadership began to change from predomi-
nantly blue-collar and uneducated to predominantly white-collar and professional.
But even then, this new leadership mobilized a mass of mostly poor and uneducated vot-
ers. Instead, low levels of education were a barrier in the context of literacy re-
quirements to register, which, until their elimination in 1976, dampened participation.
In short, Puerto Rican political participation in Hartford was determined more by the
structure and dynamic of the political and electoral setting than by the individual charac-
teristics of voters, a finding that has been noted elsewhere. 12
Political participation took off as early as 1955. In 1956, about 200 Puerto Ricans
were registered to vote, a fact that was reported by the press with some surprise. 13
In that year, Puerto Rican numbers in Hartford were estimated at 2,000, which repre-
sented a 300 percent increase from an estimated 500 in 1954. Assuming that about
25 percent were qualified to vote, the registration level was 40 percent, a remarkable
proportion for a community in which at least 75 percent were recent arrivals. Over time,
registration and turnout have been low but electoral participation has been steady.
In Hartford, the relationship between mainland- and island-based mobilization has
been complex, yet clearly tilted toward mainland-focused agendas. 14 The archives
of the Department of Puerto Rican Community Affairs in the United States of the com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico contain a reference to 40 tobacco workers from the Hart-
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ford area who flew to Puerto Rico allegedly to vote in the 1960 general election. 15
In contrast, Puerto Ricans who settled in the city never even considered voting in the
Puerto Rican election through absentee ballots; they visited their island, but more for
pleasure than out of an interest in politics. The community was not as interested as the
elite in Hartford's electoral politics, but this was dictated more by the conditions that
fostered disfranchisement than by an exclusive concern with homeland issues.
In 1986, a leading political action group, the Puerto Rican Political Action Commit-
tee of Connecticut, issued a resolution condemning as a civil rights violation the arrest
of a group of independentistas in Puerto Rico. But one looks in vain for indications that
this case moved Hartford's Puerto Rican community beyond a sporadic expression of
solidarity. The campaign of the local socialists and their allies to free those arrested and
to publicize the island's colonial status was marginal.
When the 1989-1990 debate on the proposed plebiscite on the status of Puerto Rico
raised the question whether mainland Puerto Ricans should be allowed to vote, the over-
whelming consensus in the community was that they should. In a New York policy
forum, Edwin Vargas, Jr., a local leader, presented a spirited argument for participation,
but he was then representing the National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights, a group
with a programmatic interest in the status issue whose main agenda is nonetheless
focused on issues that affect mainland Puerto Ricans. Still, Vargas began his presenta-
tion by regretting that the status issue had once again surfaced to "threaten unity in our
community." 16 In the same breath he suggested that the issue might be of ephemeral con-
cern. The idea of a plebiscite, in fact, was forced upon Congress by island leaders; once
Congress killed the initiative, mainland interest faded. Puerto Ricans in Hartford and
elsewhere went on with their lives and elite concerns went back to mainland policy and
power issues. 17
The Hartford case also suggests that although the distinction between "migrant" and
"citizen" is sociologically adequate in explaining differences between urban dwellers
and seasonal farmworkers, it does not adequately represent stages in a process of politi-
cal development entailing a mental and attitudinal transition leading from marginality to
active participation. A better characterization is provided by the distinction between eth-
nic awareness and power awareness.
Ethnic awareness in Hartford has been an expression of otherness. As a community
leader put it, "The Hartford community must understand Puerto Ricans as Puerto
Ricans. . . . Yes, we are Americans, but we don't look like Americans. Americans must
look for what the Puerto Rican has to offer." 18 Power awareness refers to the crystalliza-
tion of an attitude. "From now on," declared another community leader in the wake of
two waves of rioting by Puerto Ricans in 1969, "we are going to show [everyone] that
we are not only here, but that we want improvements . . . We plan to follow through
with our plans of bettering and upgrading the whole concept of the Puerto Rican around
the state." 19
Such has been the framework of political participation that has been constant and
defined at various moments by a sense of self and by a sense of how other political
actors come to be favored by the polity.
Separatism
While among Puerto Rican activists independence seems to be the preferred solution to
the colonial status of Puerto Rico, a majority feels that the U.S. Puerto Rican population
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predominantly favors a permanent relationship between the island and the United States.
These sentiments came to the fore in two surveys conducted by the New York-based
Institute for Puerto Rican Policy in 1988 and 1989. According to the 1988 poll, 44 per-
cent of Puerto Rican activists in the United States supported independence, while only
14 percent each supported statehood and the current commonwealth. The 1989 survey,
on the other hand, revealed that 45 percent of Puerto Rican activists agree that the pre-
ferred status of most mainland Puerto Ricans is continued commonwealth, while 30 per-
cent believe that statehood is the preferred solution and only 14 percent think the same
about independence. 20
These findings are only suggestive, yet they are in keeping with the results of the
Latino National Political Survey, which shows that a majority of mainland Puerto
Ricans (69.4%) prefer commonwealth as the permanent status of Puerto Rico. In con-
trast, only 27 percent of respondents supported statehood, and a low 3.5 percent pre-
ferred independence. 21 Moreover, in response to the question "How strong is your love
for the United States?" 31.5 percent of Puerto Ricans said "extremely strong" and 37.1
percent said "very strong"; only 8.1 percent responded "not very strong." To the ques-
tion "How proud are you to be an American?" 38.5 percent responded "extremely
proud" and 44.6 percent said "very proud." A tiny minority, only 2.3 percent of respon-
dents, said they were "not very proud" of their citizenship. 22
The history of Puerto Rican separatism in the United States is in tune with these sen-
timents. Hartford Puerto Ricans came into the public eye on March 2, 1954, when four
members of the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party took their claims for Puerto Rican inde-
pendence directly to the U.S. Congress, not in the form of a signed petition nor through
a formal process of consultation, but with guns in their hands.
The nationalists wanted to alert the world that Puerto Rico was not the showcase of
democracy touted by the United States at the United Nations and elsewhere in Latin
America but a colony of an imperial power. The United States was not Puerto Rico's
senior partner but its ruler. It had masterminded and controlled the repression of pro-
independence advocates on the island, of which the most visible example was the jailing
in a federal prison of the nationalist leader Pedro Albizu Campos.
The reactions to the shooting, however, were highly unsympathetic. In Puerto Rico
and Washington the attack was characterized as "savage and unbelievable lunacy" 23 and
contrary to our belief and our peaceful nature, an instance of "the misbehavior of a very
few."24 In New York, Felipe N. Torres, a Puerto Rican assemblyman from the Bronx,
introduced a resolution condemning the shooting, which the state assembly approved. 25
And in Illinois, a group of twenty-one Puerto Ricans presented themselves at Hines
Veterans Hospital in Maywood, a suburb of Chicago, to donate blood as a gesture of
sympathy for the wounded representatives. "We want to show the American people that
the people of Puerto Rico do not hate them," said Luis Martinez, a bodega operator.
"The nationalists are not representative of our native country. We are proud to be citi-
zens."
26
The day after the shooting, the Hartford Times ran a story titled "Local Puerto
Ricans, Few in Number, Deplore Shootings." In it Julio Falcon, a Puerto Rican li-
aison officer for tobacco workers, expressed his dismay over the incident. Defined as
transient tobacco and apple harvesters, Puerto Ricans were said to be unhappy about
the shooting. The report included a message from the fire chief of Puerto Rico to "the
fire chiefs of every town and city in the United States," reassuring them that "the vast
majority of the people of Puerto Rico are indignant at the unbelievable and criminal
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aggression of which the members of the United States Congress have been victims."27
During the 1970s, the Hartford Puerto Rican community, like most U.S. Puerto Rican
communities, experienced a surge in radical political acticity. The People's Liberation
Party (PLP) — a clone of the Young Lords Party — erupted onto the political scene in
1970, and a year later the Puerto Rican Socialist Party (PSP), which operated throughout
the Northeast, began its activities in the city. While the PLP vanished rather quickly,
the PSP was active for several years. Yet it was never fully accepted by the community
and by the mid-1970s it divided and broke apart. The most notorious separatist event
in local politics took place in 1983, when the group Los Macheteros stole over $7 mil-
lion from a Wells Fargo branch in West Hartford. The key operative in the heist was
Victor Gerena, a second-generation Puerto Rican Hartfordian born in the Bronx. But in
his chronicle of the episode, Fernandez shows how the class symbolism of the robbery
completely overshadowed its political intent. Puerto Ricans, and others, cheered
Gerena's feat, not because they sympathized with his separatist politics, but because it
was a Robin Hood sort of adventure; they were in awe of him because he represented a
working-class David who had inflicted severe damage on a greedy, capitalistic Goliath. 28
Identity
Identity politics in Hartford has been both an expressive process and one in which prior
organization and instrumental rationality played a significant role. 29 Mobilization was
not driven solely by cost-benefit calculations; rationality was also mediated by psy-
chosocial factors. Moreover, the purposive defense of identity (that is, ethnic awareness;
for example, the Puerto Rican parade, which in Hartford dates from 1 964) rather than
collapsing into a solipsistic exercise (for example, overemphasis on Puerto Rican pride)
led to the pursuit of concrete political advantages (for example, seeking representation
through extra-partisan organization and mobilization).
Although the desire for economic betterment was there, the earliest forms of Puerto
Rican association were religious and cultural. Examples include the Legion de Maria
(Legion of Mary) and the Rosario Cantado (Sung Rosary) that Olga Mele, probably the
first Puerto Rican to move to Hartford in 1941, joined and founded, respectively, in the
1950s, the baseball leagues that various community leaders organized, the Puerto Rican
parade itself, the San Juan Bautista and Park Street festivals, and so on. These initia-
tives, however, cut across their constitutive boundaries and spilled over into politics.
When La Popular, Bodega Hispana, the first Puerto Rican restaurant in the city,
opened in 1956, it quickly became the meeting place for Puerto Ricans interested in pol-
itics. Their purpose was not to plot strategies to fight corporate power but to penetrate
the Democratic Party and to fight City Hall if necessary. The interest of early leaders in
class issues was never strong; educational policy, particularly bilingual education, pro-
vided the focus for their activities. Many were convinced that politics was important for
the community without really knowing exactly why. Politics was seen not as the pursuit
of abstract goods but as the means to achieve a citizens' agenda whose goals were
defined by ethnic needs. While community as well as elite concerns did not center
around issues of "industry and idleness,"30 identity was intertwined with status.
Employment and unionization issues were there, but always in the background. As a
matter of fact, a key question that observers asked was whether Puerto Ricans would
ever tackle issues other than those related to their culture.
Even leaders with socialist credentials and links to the labor movement recognized
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that ethnicity was a crucial mobilizing factor, even if they tinted their rhetoric with a bit
of class analysis. Thus, in many electoral campaigns, support for Puerto Rican can-
didates listed on row B in the ballot was sought by using the slogan "Vota por la B de
Boricua" (Vote for row B, for Boricua), Boricua being another way of referring to a
member of the group.
Was this an opportunistic utilization of ethnicity to advance economic interests?
Many have made this claim about the relationship between ethnicity and status. David
Ward summarizes this view when he writes,
Ethnicity is a label to describe reactive responses of interest groups that have
perceived detrimental alterations in the allocation principles of public policies.
Their political loyalties do not, therefore, reflect their interests in ancestral
foreign causes but rather their concern over threats to their well-being from
competing interest groups. 31
Ethnic identity, however, need not be exclusively or predominantly related to a con-
cern with an ancestral homeland to be authentic. This is particularly true in the
American context, where one finds dissonance between identity and ancestry,32 where
identity attachments suggest more an accumulation of cultural capital than a return to
ancestral roots, 33 and where individuals are often externally prompted to adopt ethnic
classifications that they would otherwise not think about. 34 To be sure, ethnicity has
socioeconomic referents, but these are contingent; its distinctiveness is psychological
and cultural. Gurak and Kritz, for example, compared Puerto Ricans with Hispanic
immigrants to the Northeast in the 1970s to find that, among Puerto Ricans, ethnic iden-
tity in the second generation correlated with low socioeconomic status. 35 Rogler,
Cooney, and Ortiz, on the other hand, found that ethnic identity was strong regardless of
higher levels of acculturation among second-generation Puerto Rican families. 36 While
these findings are problematic, they do suggest that ethnic identity is a complex process
with a wide range of expressions from ancestral callings to leisure-time pursuits. 37 For
Hartford Puerto Ricans, identity coincided with ancestry, it cut across class and genera-
tion, and its symbolism was public and politically powerful.38
Electoral Politics
This leads us to the question of electoral politics and its promise. Between 1989 and
1992, Puerto Rican communities across the country witnessed a surge in political ac-
tivity and involvement at all levels. The most notable result of this was their election to
Congress of two Puerto Ricans, one each from Illinois and New York. They were also
active in the New York City charter revision process and the redistricting process in the
Northeast.
Puerto Ricans made significant strides in running for local offices. In New York City,
where they were 12 percent of the population, they captured 16 percent of the City
Council seats. In Hartford, they held three votes in the coalition of five that controlled
city government during the 1991-1993 term. At the time, the office of the corporation
counsel, the city's lawyer, and the Democratic Party organization in the city were
presided over by Puerto Ricans.
But in 1 989 the central fact concerning Puerto Rican electoral politics was underrep-
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Table 2
Puerto Rican Elected Officials as a Percentage
of Popularly Elected Officials
State
Total
United States
Federal Officials
Total Puerto Rican Percentage
206,737
504,404
540
143
143
4a
Puerto Rican
Percentage
of State
Population
California 19,279 03 * +
Connecticut 9,929 15 * 04
Florida 5,368 02 * 02
Illinois 38,936 08 * 1.2
Indiana 11,355 02 # +
Massachusetts 13,888 04 * 2.4
Michigan 19,292 01 * +
New Jersey 9,345 25 * 04
New York 26,343 71 * 06
Ohio 19,750 05 * +
Pennsylvania 33,242 07 * 1.2
02
1.1
Sources: Jose E. Cruz, 1992 elected officials survey; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Popularly Elected Officials in 1987, Preliminary Report, GC87-2(P), December 1988.
a Includes Puerto Rico's resident commissioner in Washington.
* Less than one-tenth of one percent.
+ Less than one percent.
resentation. By 1983, three states with large Puerto Rican concentrations — Illinois,
New Jersey, and New York— had six congressional districts with Latino proportions
ranging from 26 to 51 percent. This circumstance was considered favorable to the
election of an ethnic candidate, possibly a Puerto Rican. 39 But by 1989 this had not
come about.
1989 Survey
The 1 989 survey identified 1 23 elected officials of Puerto Rican background in eleven
states with Puerto Rican populations of 10,000 or more —California, Connecticut,
Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania. With 74 percent of all Puerto Ricans in the United States living in those
states in 1980, it was reasonable to compare the level of representation there against the
total number of elected officials in the country. Puerto Ricans were one percent of the
total U.S. population but less than one-tenth of one percent of all elected public office-
holders in the fifty states. Puerto Ricans represented 1.6 percent of the total population
in the states mentioned above, but again, less than one-tenth of one percent of all elected
officials.
Compared with Latinos, Puerto Ricans were still underrepresented. They were 21
percent of all Latinos in the surveyed states but only 17 percent of all Latino elected
officials. Considering only those states where Puerto Rican numbers were highest,
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Table 3
Puerto Rican Elected Officials (PREO) as a Percentage
of Hispanic Elected Officials (HEO)
State
Pue rto Rican
Percentage
of State
HEO PREO Percentage Pop ulation
617 03 + 1.7
17 15 88 69
60 02 3.3 16
139 08 06 17
09 02 22 14
04 04 100 53
12 01 8.3 09
42 25 60 42
76 71 93.4 49
08 05 63 3.5
09 07 78 65
California
Connecticut
Florida
Illinois
Indiana
Massachusetts
Michigan
New Jersey
New York
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Total 993 143 14.4 17.5
Sources: NALEO, 7557 National Roster of Hispanic Elected Officials; Jose E. Cruz, 1992 elected officials sur-
vey; U.S. Bureau of the Census.
+ Less than one percent.
the comparison was more favorable. In Connecticut, Puerto Ricans were 71 percent of
the Latino population but 99 percent of all Latino elected officials. In New Jersey, they
were 50 percent of all Latinos but 60 percent of Latinos elected to public office. In New
York, where Puerto Ricans were 59 percent of all Latinos, they were 79 percent of all
Latino elected officials.
Still, while they constituted 4.4 percent of the total population in those three states,
they were less than one-half of one percent of all public officeholders.
1992 Survey
Although it is widely acknowledged that redistricting brought increased representation
for Puerto Ricans, the aggregate gains were not significant enough to achieve parity. The
survey conducted in 1992 identified 143 elected officials of Puerto Rican background in
the eleven states of the 1989 survey, an increase of twenty officials, or 16.2 percent.
Currently, 90 percent of all Puerto Ricans in the U.S. mainland live in these eleven
states. While in 1990 Puerto Ricans exceeded one percent of the total U.S. population
for the first time, in 1992 they were less than one-tenth of one percent of the total num-
ber of popularly elected officials in the country. In the eleven states with Puerto Rican
representation, they were 2 percent of the total population in 1990 but less than one-
tenth of one percent of all elected officials.
In 1989, Puerto Ricans, compared with Latinos, were underrepresented in the eleven
states by four percentage points. In 1992 the gap widened, the Puerto Rican proportion
of Latinos being 17.5 percent compared with 8.2 percent of Latino elected officials.
This was partly owing to the inclusion of Chicago school council members in the total
number of Illinois officials.
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Table 4
Puerto Ricans as a Percentage of Hispanics and Hispanic Elected Officials
(HEO) in States with Largest Puerto Rican Concentrations
1989 1992
Percentage Percentage Gap Percentage Percentage Gap
ofHisp of HEO Hisp of HEO
Connecticut 71 99 +28 69 88.0 +19.0
New Jersey 50 60 +10 42 60.0 +18.0
New York 59 79 +20 49 93.4 +44.4
Sources: Jose E. Cruz, 1989 and 1992 elected officials survey; National Puerto Rican Coalition, Puerto
Ricans in the U.S. Mainland: A Special Report Based on the 1990 Decennial Census (June 1992).
Puerto Ricans do much better in the most populous states. In Connecticut, they were
69 percent of Latinos but 88 percent of Latino elected officials in 1992; in New
Jersey,the proportions were 42 percent and 60 percent, respectively. And in New York,
Puerto Ricans were 49 percent of Latinos but 78 percent of Latino elected officials.
Table 3 summarizes this correlation for the surveyed states. Table 4 shows, however, that
changes in the overrepresentation margin in Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York
were in part the result of decreases in the percentage of Puerto Rican Latinos in those
states. In New Jersey, the overrepresentation margin increased by eleven points even
though representation decreased slightly. In Connecticut, the margin increased
slightly in tandem with a slight increase in representation. But in New York, a decrease
in the proportion of Puerto Rican Latinos correlated with significant increases in the
number of elected officials and the overrepresentation margin.
In absolute terms, the balance was positive for the years 1989-1992. But Indiana saw
its representation shrink by more than 50 percent and New Jersey lost one representa-
tive. Florida, whose Puerto Rican population grew by 158.6 percent during 1980-1990,
re-ported no net gains in representation. In Massachusetts, the Puerto Rican population
grew by 102 percent and gained one elected official. This balance, however, obscures
the fact that Puerto Ricans lost their only representative at the state level, the Honorable
Nelson Merced. Although California, Connecticut, and Ohio had net gains, New York
recorded the largest gain, with an increase in Puerto Rican representation of 3 1 .4 per-
cent, a direct result of the New York City charter revision redistricting. Table 5 illus-
trates the changes in representation by state.
At the federal level, Puerto Rican representation more than doubled. Counting the
resident commissioner of Puerto Rico in Washington, Puerto Ricans comprise 24 per-
cent of Latinos in the House of Representatives (4 of 17). Island and mainland Puerto
Ricans constitute 24 percent of U.S. Latinos. If the resident commissioner is excluded,
the Puerto Rican proportion of Latinos in the House decreases to 17.6 percent; but this
share goes beyond parity, since mainland Puerto Ricans are only 12.2 percent of the
22.4 million Latinos counted by the 1990 census.
In 1992, Puerto Rican representation in Congress as a percentage of federal elected
officials moved a bit closer to parity compared with the Puerto Rican proportion of the
total U.S. population (1.1%), with 0.7 percent of all officials, compared with less than
half of one percent in 1989.
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Table 5
Puerto Rican Elected Officials by State, 1989 and 1992
State 1989 1992 Change
California 1 3 +02
Connecticut 14 15 +01
Florida 2 2 00
Illinois 8 8 00
Indiana 5 2 -03
Massachusetts 3 4 +01
Michigan 1 1 00
New Jersey 26 25 -01
New York 54 71 +17
Ohio 2 5 +03
Pennsylvania 7 7 00
Totals 123 14 +20
Source: Jose E. Cruz, 1989 and 1992 elected officials surveys.
Table 6
Total, Hispanic, and Puerto Rican Population of Jurisdictions
with Puerto Rican Political Representation, 1990
Puerto Rican Puerto Rican
Puerto Percentage Percentage
City Total Hispanic Rican of Total of Hispanic
California
San Francisco3 723,959 100,717 4,701 * 4.6
San Jose 782,248 208,388 4,472 * 2.1
Connecticut
Bridgeport 141,686 37,547 30,250 21.3 80.5
Hartford 139,739 44,137 38,176 27.3 86.4
New Britain 75,491 12,284 10,325 13.6 84.0
New Haven 130,474 17,243 13,866 10.6 80.4
Willimanticb 14,746 2,343 1,942 13.1 82.8
Florida
Orlando 164,693 14,401 7,035 4.2 48.8
Sweetwater 13,909 12,938 338 2.4 2.6
Illinois
Chicago 2,783,726 545,852 119,866 4.3 21.9
Lombard 39,408 1,090 139 * 12.7
Indiana
East Chicago 33,892 16,196 3,446 10.1 21.2
Lake Station 13,899 1,834 748 5.3 40.7
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Table 6, continued
Puerto Rican Puerto Rican
Puerto Percentage Percentage
City Total Hispanic Rican of Total of Hispanic
Massachusetts
Amherstb 17,824 679 260 1.4 38.2
Chelsea 28,170 9,018 4,581 16.2 50.7
Holyoke 43,704 13,573 12,687 29.0 93.4
Michigan
Madison Heights 32,196 399 35 * 8.7
New Jersey
Camden 87,492 27,273 22,984 26.2 84.2
Englewood 24,850 3,893 583 02.3 14.9
Hoboken 33,397 10,036 6,833 20.4 68.0
Jersey City 228,537 55,395 30,950 13.5 55.8
Mount Holly 10,639 609 450 4.2 73.8
Passaic 58,041 29,028 11,626 20.0 40.0
Paterson 40,891 57,711 27,580 19.5 47.7
Perth Amboy 41,967 23,310 13,531 32.2 58.0
Vineland 54,780 12,926 11,672 21.3 90.2
Woodbined 2,678 441 361 13.4 81.8
New York
Brentwood 13 45,218 15,692 8,203 18.1 52.2
Bronx County 1,203,789 523,111 349,115 29.0 66.7
Buffalo 328,123 16,129 12,798 3.9 79.3
Kings County
(Brooklyn) 2,300,664 462,411 274,530 11.9 59.3
New York Citye 7,322,564 1,783,511 896,763 12.2 50.2
New York County 1,487,536 386,630 154,978 10.4 40.0
Queens County 1,951,598 381,120 100,410 5.1 26.3
Richmond County
(Staten Island) 378,977 30,239 17,730 4.6 58.6
Rochester 231,636 20,055 16,383 7.0 81.6
Ohio
Cleveland 505,616 23,197 17,829 3.5 76.8
Lorain 71,245 12,065 9,382 13.1 77.7
Pennsylvania
Bristold 10,405 914 805 7.7 88.0
Harrisburg 52,376 4,022 3,051 05.8 75.8
Philadelphia 1,585,577 89,193 67,857 04.2 76.0
Reading 78,380 14,486 11,612 14.8 80.1
Totals 16,094,176 3,238,525 1,424,120 88.8 43.9
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1990 Census of Population, unpublished data.
aCounty.
^Census designated place; these are closely settled population centers without legally established limits.
State and local officials delineate CDPs following Census Bureau guidelines.
cVillage.
"Borough.
eNumbers not included in total.
*Less than one percent.
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Constituencies and Public Policy Priorities
Puerto Rican elected officials serve large and diverse constituencies. Fourteen percent of
respondents serve populations numbering between 50,000 and 100,000, and a full 50
percent serve constituencies of more than 100,000. Almost half serve constituencies that
are more than 50 percent Latino; of these, 52 percent serve constituencies that are more
than 50 percent Puerto Rican. Only 30 percent of respondents serve voters who are more
than 50 percent non-Hispanic white, and a small proportion, 9 percent, serve constituen-
cies that are more than 50 percent African-American. A full 30 percent, however, serve
constituencies that are between 20 percent and 40 percent non-Hispanic white, and 63
percent serve voters who are between 20 percent and 40 percent African-American.
Education is the single most important public policy priority of respondent elected
officials, but there is no single focus on this issue. Of the fifty-four respondents
(51.4% of the total) listing education at the top of their agenda, 61 percent further speci-
fied the focus of their interest, which included everything from bilingual education
to dropout prevention to physical plant issues. Housing came next, but with only twenty-
six respondents (25% of the total) listing it as a priority; it was followed by eco-
nomic development, with twenty-one respondents indicating it as an issue. For Puerto
Rican elected officials, the top six public policy issues are, in rank order, education,
housing, economic development, health care, crime prevention, and civil rights.
Presumably, these issues provided the campaign themes on which the officials were
elected and should provide the criteria of evaluation of their performance.
Representation and Socioeconomic Status
It is not possible to provide an adequate evaluation of that performance in this review,
except indirectly. The 1990 census shows that the labor-market performance and
socioeconomic status of Puerto Ricans were mixed during the 1980s, marked by both
progress and stagnation. However, there are no indicators to support a positive correla-
tion between political representation and socioeconomic status. The available evi-
dence suggests that during the 1980s, Puerto Rican progress and stagnation were func-
tions of economic growth, differences in regional economies, human-capital characteris-
tics, and migration status. 40 Yet because public policy often moves in the interstices of
individual capabilities and economic conditions, some inferences can be made about the
relation between political representation and socioeconomic status.
Between 1979 and 1989, the mean annual household income of Puerto Ricans
increased by 25 percent, from $23,463 to $29,264. Similarly, the mean per capita house-
hold income grew by 29 percent, from $6,490 to $8,370, with the margin between
household and per capita income accounted for by reductions in the size of the average
household. 41 On the other hand, the income gap between Puerto Ricans and non-His-
panic whites continued to be enormous, with Puerto Ricans earning only fifty-three
cents for every dollar earned by non-Hispanic whites in 1989. While the poverty rate
among Puerto Ricans decreased from 36.4 percent in 1980 to 30.3 percent in 1990, it
was still more than double the rate for the population as a whole and six percentage
points higher than the rate for Latinos. 42
This situation suggests that in the absence of public policies which target Puerto
Rican needs, some Puerto Ricans experience increases in earnings and move out of
poverty, in keeping with increases in economic activity and gains in human capital,
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while others continue to experience economic and social disadvantage. Indeed, reduc-
tions in poverty rates are associated with decreases in unemployment, and between
March 1986 and March 1989, decreases in Puerto Rican unemployment correlated with
shifts in occupational patterns — from blue- to white-collar occupations — and in-
creases in educational attainment.43 What this means is that Puerto Rican elected offi-
cials are saddled with the central responsibility of supporting and effecting two kinds of
public policies: those which promote economic growth and those which enable individu-
als to reap the benefits of growing economic environments.
While it would be tempting at this point to conclude that political representation has
failed to deliver on its promise of progress for Puerto Ricans, three major reasons sug-
gest a different approach. First, electoral politics matters. When the face of power
changes, public policy changes in tandem. Yet simple representation is not enough; to be
successful, political representation requires a certain kind of leadership and a cer-
tain kind of demographic and political context. Leaders must be honest, committed, en-
ergetic, and smart;44 emerging constituencies must be demographically strong. At a
minimum, access to governing bodies must translate into significant influence and, opti-
mally, it must entail control of crucial decision-making structures; finally, public opinion
must favor the direction sought for public policy, and local policy responsiveness must
be matched by state and federal support. 45 This is a complex set of requirements, but it
nonetheless provides a realistic prescription for success in electoral politics.
Second, the system is relatively open, so that outcasts can and do become protago-
nists. The conventional wisdom about interest groups in America is that they control
congressional decision making. If this is true, the logical corollary is that to control pub-
lic policy, political representation is unnecessary. Indeed, by this logic government is
simply the executive committee of the best-organized and most resourceful group.
But the conventional wisdom about interest groups is, in fact, not true. The pressure sys-
tem in the United States has been charged with having a definite "upper class bias,"46
which has contributed to an image of homogeneity of interests, structure, goals, and
effectiveness that does not jibe with the reality. The system is, instead, "conflictual, per-
meable, [and] unpredictable,"47 marked by different rates of success among groups
and by a curious inability of any one group to seize control of the public policy
agenda. 48 This agenda is susceptible to external input, but it is ultimately controlled by
those who hold public office. If this were not the case the pressure system would not be
necessary; but it is the case, and more important, control of public office is not beyond
the scope of possibilities for Puerto Ricans locally or at the national level.
Third, public policy makes a difference. When early on in his presidency, Ronald
Reagan stated that in the 1960s we declared a war on poverty and poverty won, he
was making a case against public policy. In fact, in what amounted to a rekindling of
1960s Cold War liberalism, Reagan was telling the American people to "ask not
what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country." The corollary
question here is, Who should not ask for governmental favors? The construction and
automotive interests that benefited from the creation of the interstate highway system?
The homeowners who were rewarded with the mortgage interest deduction? The veter-
ans who were given access to higher education through the GI bill? Clearly, these are
sectors of the population for whom public policy did work. They were never told to "ask
not," and no one ever suggested to them that government responses to social needs are
doomed to fail.
The problem in the United States, however, is not one of failed public policies but of
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a failure to establish them in the first place; we are at fault by omission rather than
by commission. During the 1980s, tax and transfer systems in seven Western European
countries cushioned the effects of economic change on the incomes of their citizens;
this did not happen in the United States, where the absence of subsidized child care, the
failure to expand the earned income tax credit,49 and heavy reliance on means-tested
benefits were contributing factors to the country's inability to provide economic security
to families with children. In France and the United Kingdom, about 50 percent of house-
holds headed by young adults were lifted out of poverty by tax and transfer programs
in the first half of the 1980s, but the United States experienced no such reductions. 50
Thus, it is clear that government intervention is not futile and that the failure — or suc-
cess — of representation is relative to the philosophy and interests of those who control
public office at any given time.
What Must Be Done?
Early in the 1990s, Puerto Ricans used reapportionment and redistricting to increase
their level of political representation. Now they must turn to other strategies. These
include enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, increasing the number of Puerto Ricans
who run for office, and increasing the number of those who vote. In light of marked
demographic dispersion, Puerto Ricans will have to build more and better coalitions
with African-Americans, whites, and others, as they have done brilliantly in the past in
places like Massachusetts and Connecticut. 51
The key challenge that Puerto Rican elected officials face is how to translate access
into power in the context of small numbers, universalism in public policy, and
slow growth. Getting elected is only half the game — governing being the other half.
Puerto Rican elected officials have their public policy priorities right, but the available
evidence strongly suggests that they are not having an impact on Puerto Rican prob-
lems. Whether this is due to structural factors (economic restructuring, declining region-
al economies), political factors (such as universalism and pitfalls of coalition-based
regimes), the characteristics of Puerto Rican elected officials (for example, a majority
of first-termers/mediocre leaders), or a combination of these and other factors, this
analysis cannot tell.
One general prescription, however, seems appropriate. To be effective Puerto Ricans
must become full partners in the process whereby government develops working
relations with public and private centers of power. 52 The Hartford experience suggests
that effective leaders cannot be good brokers between public and private power if
the institutional component of public power shuts out the electorate. 53 But it is clear that
a concern with grassroots interests should not be equated with a rejection of private
power as somehow illegitimate.
Many centuries ago, Aristotle dealt with the issue of pluralism and its relationship to
political power. In The Politics he wrote, "Suppose all these to be present in a single
city — that is to say, the good, the rich and the well-born, and beside them a mass of
citizens — will there or will there not be dispute as to which should rule? . . . We have
to ask ourselves how to reach a conclusion [regarding who should rule] when these ele-
ments are present at one and the same time."54 Needless to say, he did not reach an
acceptable conclusion. Yet when he argued that the "state is a plurality, which must
depend on education to bring about its common unity,"55 he implicitly suggested that to
resolve these disputes, the integrity of the groups and interests in question need not be
215
New England Journal of Public Policy
sacrificed. Puerto Ricans should pay heed to this Aristotelian insight by recognizing that
without the cooperation of business and labor, insurance companies and nonprofit corpo-
rations, private lobbies and public bureaucracies, it is unlikely that Puerto Ricans will be
able to legislate and implement the public policies needed to bring equality and progress
for all.**
This article is based on a paper I presented at the University of the Sacred Heart, Santurce, Puerto
Rico, in April 1994. I am grateful to Carlos Santiago and Todd Swanstrom for their comments.
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"Contrary to their invisibility in the political leadership liter-
ature, Latina women play important leadership roles
in both the electoral arena and at the community level
As political leaders, Latina women make signifi-
cant contributions to Latino community empowerment"
- Carol Hardy-Fanta
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